

Blockchain solutions for IoT security and privacy

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Heudiasyc, UMR CNRS, Université de Technologie de Compiègne


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June 4th, 2020



1. Context
2. Backgrounds (IoT security, blockchain)
3. Blockchain-based security solutions for IoT
4. A blockchain-based anonymous data sharing protocol for VANETs
5. Conclusion & Perspectives

- ❑ **Internet of Things (IoT)** is a new emerging technology that consists to connect physical world to Internet
- ❑ IoT is an enabling technology for Cyber-Physical Systems (**Systems of Systems**)
- ❑ **A System of Systems (SoS)** is an integration of a finite number of constituent systems which are independent and work together to achieve a high common goal
- ❑ **IoT based SoS characteristics:** Operational and managerial independence, Evolutionary independence, Geographic distribution, Emergent behavior




IoT security/privacy : an important challenge



- Security is on the top of important issues in IoT
- In recent years, **52%** of connected objects had no security countermeasures
- IoT operates in open environments, exposed to various malicious attacks
- IoT security is deeply linked to people's daily lives
- Traditional security solutions are inapplicable in the context of IoT due to **limitation of resources, scalability issues, heterogeneity**, etc.


➤ Several security services need to be ensured in IoT:

- ❖ Authentication of IoT devices
- ❖ Data confidentiality
- ❖ Data Integrity
- ❖ Availability
- ❖ Trust management
- ❖ Data privacy



- ❑ The blockchain is a decentralized database which is duplicated and shared by nodes communicating via Peer to Peer infrastructure
- ❑ No central entity that controls the whole blockchain
- ❑ The blocks are connected to each others. Each block contains the hash of its previous block
- ❑ Each block is validated by blockchain validators based on a consensus protocol (PoW, PoS, PBFT, etc.)
- ❑ Blockchain allows: **immutability, traceability, no single point of trust, transparency**





| International journals (x2) | International conferences (x6) |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Computer Networks (Elsevier, IF: 3.030) • IEEE Trans. on Dependable and Secure Computing (IF: 6.404) <p>Submitted journal papers: IEEE Trans. on Dependable and Secure Computing (IF: 6.404)</p> | <p>IEEE Globecom 2017, IEEE/IFIP IM 2017, IEEE ISPA 2017, IEEE SoSE 2018, IEEE Truscom 2018, IEEE ISCC 2020</p> <p>Submitted papers: IEEE Globecom 2020</p> |
| Total : 2 et 1 submitted | Total : 6 et 1 submitted |

Blockchain-based security solutions for the IoT/fog applications


- ❑ Extension of cloud services at the edge of the IoT (**fog computing**)
- ❑ Many security challenges related to IoT/fog/Cloud : **trust management, authentication, etc**

Mutual authentication at IoT/fog/cloud

- Blockchain as a secure database to store fog nodes' public keys
- Threshold cryptography to authenticate the IoT devices

Trust management in IoT

- Decentralized trust management protocol
- Support the mobility of IoT devices



A blockchain-based anonymous data sharing scheme for VANETs [4]


[4] **Kouicem, D. E.**, Bouabdallah, A., Hicham, L. *An Efficient and Anonymous Blockchain-Based Data Sharing Scheme for Vehicular Networks*. In the 25th IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications.

Problem: How to develop an **anonymous** data sharing protocol in VANETs ?

- ❑ Vehicles generate complex and **sensitive** traffic data
- ❑ VANETs are subjected to several malicious attacks that threaten the privacy of conductors

Our **Data sharing** protocol:


- supports the **mobility** of vehicles,
- **protects the privacy** of the conductors, and
- does not need a **pre-trusted entity** in the whole system.



- ❑ 87% of americans can be identified only with the triplet (birthday, Sex, ZIP)
- ❑ Data privacy protection requieres anonymization techniques (k-anonymity, l-diversity, differential privacy)

❑ **Definition : Working group G29 (GDPR)**

- **Individualization:** is it possible to separate a person from
- **Non correlation:** is it possible to link separate datasets together concerning the same individual ?
- **Inference:** can we deduce information about an individual ?




Source: [Sweeney, 2002]

K-anonymity and l-diversity models


Original dataset


| id | Zipcode | Age | National. | Disease |
|----|---------|-----|-----------|-----------------|
| 1 | 13053 | 28 | Russian | Heart Disease |
| 2 | 13068 | 29 | American | Heart Disease |
| 3 | 13068 | 21 | Japanese | Viral Infection |
| 4 | 13053 | 23 | American | Viral Infection |
| 5 | 14853 | 50 | Indian | Cancer |
| 6 | 14853 | 55 | Russian | Heart Disease |
| 7 | 14850 | 47 | American | Viral Infection |
| 8 | 14850 | 49 | American | Viral Infection |
| 9 | 13053 | 31 | American | Cancer |
| 10 | 13053 | 37 | Indian | Cancer |
| 11 | 13068 | 36 | Japanese | Cancer |
| 12 | 13068 | 35 | American | Cancer |



4-anonymous data

| id | Zipcode | Age | National. | Disease |
|----|---------|-----|-----------|-----------------|
| 1 | 130** | <30 | * | Heart Disease |
| 2 | 130** | <30 | * | Heart Disease |
| 3 | 130** | <30 | * | Viral Infection |
| 4 | 130** | <30 | * | Viral Infection |
| 5 | 1485* | ≥40 | * | Cancer |
| 6 | 1485* | ≥40 | * | Heart Disease |
| 7 | 1485* | ≥40 | * | Viral Infection |
| 8 | 1485* | ≥40 | * | Viral Infection |
| 9 | 130** | 3* | * | Cancer |
| 10 | 130** | 3* | * | Cancer |
| 11 | 130** | 3* | * | Cancer |
| 12 | 130** | 3* | * | Cancer |





Definition:


Cryptographic tool that enables a **Prover** to convince a **Verifier** of the validity of a **statement**. It verifies the following requirements:



- **Completeness:** If the statement is true, the **Prover** will be able to convince any honest **Verifier**
- **Soundness:** If the statement is false, a **cheating Prover** cannot convince any honest **Verifier** that it is true
- **Zero-Knowledge:** The **Prover** does not reveal anything excepts the validity of the statement

Non-Interactive ZKP: there is no multiple exchanges between the **Prover** and the **verifier**

- ❑ The **consortium blockchain** is maintained by powerful edge nodes
- ❑ The blockchain is used to store the **indexes** to raw data and proof of **its authenticity**
- ❑ The storage of data is done using a decentralized **publish-subscribe** model (ex. MQTT):
 - Each Edge node is served as a MQTT broker
 - Vehicles are subscribers/publishers in our model
- ❑ The authentication of data is based on **ZKP**



1. Generation of public parameters by Certificate Authority (CA)

$$params = \{g_1, g_2, \hat{e}, aud_{pk}, H\}$$

2. Generation of Edge RSU keys


- CA generates a public and private keys (PK_{RSU_i}, SK_{RSU_i})

3. Generation of vehicles' keys

- CA generates a long term public and private pair keys

$$LTK_i = \{PK_i = (g_1^{x_1}, g_1^{x_2}), SK_i = (x_1, x_2)\}$$

- CA generate a certificate $C_i = (F_i = (g_1 g_1^{x_1} g_1^S)^{\frac{1}{\beta+w}}, w, s)$



1. Generation of one-time public/private keys

- Vehicle V_i picks a random $r_d \in Z_p$ and generates the one-time keys:

$$OTK_i = \{otpk_i = g_1^{x_1} g_1^{H(g_1^{x_2 * r_d})}, \quad otsk_i = x_1 + H(g_1^{r_d})\}$$


2. Generation of ZKP by the vehicle V_i [Elli et. al, Zerocash 2014]

- Vehicle V_i generates a proof that the OTK_i is computed based on its long term key

$$C_r = (C_{cert} = g_1 \cdot aud_{pk}^{r_{cert}}, \quad B_{cert} = g_1^{r_{cert}})$$

$$\Theta = F_i^\rho, R_c = \hat{e}(g_1 C_{cert}^{r_1} g_1^{r_2} \Theta^{-r_3} aud_{pk}^{-r_4}, g_2) \quad \rho, r_{cert}, r_1, r_2, r_3, r_4 \text{ are randomly generated}$$

- Vehicle V_i generates the challenge: $c = H_1(timestamp || h || C_r || \Theta || R_c)$.
- It computes the values : $z_1 = r_1 + c \cdot \rho, \quad z_2 = r_2 + c \cdot \rho \cdot s, \quad z_3 = r_3 + c \cdot w, \quad z_4 = c \cdot r_{cert} \cdot \rho$
- It outputs the Zero-Knowledge Proof : $ZKP = (c, z_1, z_2, z_3, z_4)$



1. Raw Data uploading

- Vehicle V_i generates a raw data D and sign it using its short term secret key $otsk_i$
signature : $\sigma = \{D\}_{otsk_i}$
metadata = $(timestamp || otpk_i || ZKP || \Theta || description || \sigma || C_r)$
- Vehicle V_i send the raw data D alongside the *metadata* to one edge node

2. Verification and storage of raw data By Edge Nodes

- Check the correctness the signature σ using the one-time public key $otpk_i$
- Check the correctness of ZKP proof

$$R'_c = \hat{e}(g_1 C_{cert}^{z_1} g_1^{z_2} \Theta^{-z_3} aud_{pk}^{-z_4}, g_2) \cdot \hat{e}(\Theta, aud_{pk})^{-c}$$


Check if $c = H(timestamp || otpk_i || C_r || \Theta || R'_c)$
- Validate and store the metadata into the blockchain

⚙️ **Assumption:** there is at least $(2/3)*N+1$ of nodes that are not faulty and trusted. N is the number of edge servers (validator nodes).

➤ **Our enhanced PBFT:** the edge node chooses $\log(N)$, instead of all the N validators, based on:



$$P_{selection}(v_i) = \frac{C_i}{\sum_{k=1}^N C_k}$$

C_i : the storage capacity of the validator v_i




Settings & test environment


- Blockchain: Tendermint platform (<https://docs.tendermint.com/>)
- 10 Docker containers that act as brokers and validator nodes
- Cryptographic tools: PBC pairing library (<https://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/download.html>)



Blockchain layer: impact of transactions rate and number of validator nodes



Validation latency w.r.t. transactions rate



Validation latency w.r.t. the number of validators

7. Conclusion and perspectives

- We proposed an anonymous Blockchain-based data sharing protocol for VANETs
- Our results are promising and show that blockchain can leverage security and privacy in IoT applications

As perspectives, we intend to:

- Investigate other efficient anonymization techniques like I-diversity and **differential privacy** techniques in VANETs
- Address the problem of protection of vehicles' geolocations using “Gridding” techniques
- Investigate the privacy issues related to blockchain technology applied in the context of IoT (Zk-Snark techniques)

Thanks !

– International Journal publications

1. **Kouicem, D. E.**, Bouabdallah, A., & Hicham, L. (2018). *Internet of things security: A top-down survey*. Computer Networks, 141, 199-221.
2. **Kouicem, D. E.**, Imine, Y., Bouabdallah, A., Hicham, L. *Trust management based blockchain protocol for Internet of Things*”. in IEEE Transaction on Dependable and Secure Computing. To appear

– International Conference publications

1. **Kouicem, D. E.**, Abdelmadjid, B., & Hicham, L. *Distributed Fine-Grained Secure Control of Smart Actuators in Internet of Things*. In 2017 IEEE ISPA (pp. 653-660).
2. Imine, Y., **Kouicem, D. E.**, Bouabdallah, A., & Ahmed, L. *MASFOG: An Efficient Mutual Authentication Scheme for Fog Computing Architecture*. In 17th IEEE Trustcom, 2018.
3. **Kouicem, D. E.**, Bouabdallah, A., Hicham, L. *An Efficient Architecture for Trust Management in IoE Based Systems of Systems*. In the 13th IEEE SoSE, 2018.
4. **Kouicem, D. E.**, Bouabdallah, A., Hicham, L. *An Efficient and Anonymous Blockchain-Based Data Sharing Scheme for Vehicular Networks*. In the 25th IEEE ISCC.
5. I. Fajjari, N. Aitsaadi, **Kouicem DE.** A Novel SDN Scheme for QoS Path Allocation in Wide Area Networks. In 2017 IEEE GLOBECOM 2017, Singapore, December 4-8, 2017.
6. **Kouicem DE.**, I. Fajjari, N. Aitsaadi. An enhanced Path Computation for Wide Area Networks based on Software Defined Networking. In 2017 IFIP/IEEE IM, Lisbon, Portugal, May 8-12, 2017